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The econometric analysis of economic growth has always been subject to major flaws and 
shortcomings.  Data scarcity and reliability, parameter heterogeneity, omitted variable bias, 
endogeneity problems, … have seriously tainted estimation results.  In this paper we propose 
an alternative framework that explicitly deals with these issues.  We investigate the relation 
between income inequality and economic growth in a number of OECD countries in a 
cointegrated VAR-setting.  Our results suggest that different models hold for different 
countries.   However, for most countries the imperfect markets model better describes reality 
than the complete markets model.   
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Introduction 
 
Until the mid-1970s the Kuznets curve (Kuznets (1955)) was accepted as an empirical 
stylised fact.  The Kuznets curve describes the relationship between income inequality and 
per capita income.  According to the Kuznets hypothesis, economic progress is initially 
accompanied by rising inequality but as soon as per capita income reaches a certain 
threshold, inequality starts to decrease again.  Note that the relationship between growth and 
inequality under the Kuznets hypothesis depends on the level of per capita income: once a 
certain threshold has been crossed (once societies are rich enough), further growth will 
reduce inequality.  However, in the late 1970s the Kuznets picture was disturbed by a 
sudden increase (the UK, Germany) or a stagnation (France, Canada) in inequality in some 
rich countries.  These events questioned the universal validity of the Kuznets curve and gave 
way to a new development in the empirical literature on inequality and economic growth.  
Although some authors remained faithful to the Kuznets idea and suggested modifications to 
the basic framework (o.a. Milanovic (1994)), others have questioned the causal linkages 
between economic growth and inequality.  Ever since a closer look at data in the mid-1980s 
had shown that more inequality was always associated with lower long-run growth, the 
believe that inequality, rather than growth, is the determining factor in the relationship made 
way.    
  
The question whether and how inequality is related to economic growth inspired a lot of 
empirical research over the past decade.  In the early 1990s, several authors showed that 
higher inequality at the beginning of a longer-term period was linked to poorer growth 
performances (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1994, 1996), Persson and Tabellini 
(1994)).  This resulted in a consensus that inequality worsens growth performances.       
Gradually the consensus weakened.  First, it was argued that the relationship differs between 
poor and rich countries (Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (1999)).  A negative relationship 
was found in developing countries, but for richer countries there was no relation at all.   
Recently a new consensus with a very different content seems to take shape: inequality 
stimulates economic growth (Forbes (2000), Arjona et al. (2001)).  Given this evolution, one 
might conclude that the world has changed drastically over the past decade thereby 
disturbing well-established economic relations.    
However, a closer look shows that not the world but rather the econometric techniques to 
analyse it have been the subject of major changes.  The earliest empirical contribution 
presented OLS and 2SLS estimates.  Next, 3SLS and random and fixed effects panel 
estimators were used.  These were in turn replaced by panel GMM estimators.  Still, Durlauf 
(2001) notes that ‘while we have seen remarkable advances in the econometric analysis of 
many areas of microeconomics and macroeconomics, growth economics has not 
experienced anything close to such progress’ (p. 65).   
 
We explore the possibilities of yet another econometric approach.  A short overview of past 
contributions in the next section clarifies Durlauf’s provocative statement and provides a 
motivation for our alternative.  In this paper, we analyse the relationship between income 
inequality and economic growth using a cointegration approach within a VAR model.            
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  We motivate our econometric approach 
in section 1.  Section 2 looks into two theoretical models for income inequality and economic 
growth: the complete markets model and the imperfect markets model.  A description of the 
dataset follows in section 3.  In section 4 the results of the cointegration analysis are 
reported.  We try to identify the long run relations and check whether these relations allow us 
to discriminate between the structural models presented in section 2.  The conclusion 
summarizes the most important insights of the paper.   
   3
The econometrics of inequality and growth 
 
There has been a substantial evolution in growth econometrics since the beginning of the 
1990s.  In the bulk of early empirical work on growth a linear cross-country regression is 
estimated by means of OLS.  Growth is regressed on several (lagged) explanatory variables 
as GDP, schooling, … and income inequality (Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995)).  Several 
shortcomings of this approach have been noted, varying from an omitted variable bias and 
data heterogeneity to endogeneity.   
 
If an important determinant is omitted in the estimation, the estimated coefficients of all 
included variables will be biased.  This omitted variable bias is especially problematic in 
growth empirics, as the list of factors that can plausibly affect growth seems without limit.  
Durlauf (2003) discriminates between two kinds of regressors in traditional cross-country 
regressions: the ones offered by the Solow growth model (population growth, technological 
change, physical and human capital and savings rates) and those added by the new growth 
theories.  While the former list is fixed, no consensus about the latter exists.  As the number 
of data points available for growth estimates is not that large, a lot of potentially relevant 
regressors need to be excluded.  The omitted variable problem seems hard to overcome as 
modern growth theories are fundamentally open-ended: one growth theory typically has no 
bearing on the empirical relevance of another.             
 
Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Canova (1999), Krueger and Lindahl (2000), Kourtellos (2002) 
and Sonedda (2003) show that the assumption of parameter homogeneity in standard growth 
analyses is neither supported by the data, nor by theory.  Durlauf (2001) argues that ‘there is 
nothing in growth theory which would lead one to think that the marginal effect of a change in 
high school enrolment percentages on the per capita growth of the US should be the same 
as the effect on a country in sub-Saharan Africa’ (p.67).  He agrees that this argument is 
generally applicable in econometrics, but as any parsimonious growth regression will 
necessarily leave out many factors that from the perspective of economic theory affect the 
parameters of the included variables, it is particularly salient in the case of cross-country 
growth.  The different ‘income inequality – growth’ relationship between richer and poorer 
countries (Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (1999)) also illustrates that enforcing one 
overall relation will necessarily induce poor estimation results.    
An important remark in the heterogeneity debate, is the lower data quality in developing 
countries (Schultz (1999)).  One can imagine that lower income countries systematically 
underreport inequality due to a failure in data collection.  If this is true, low inequality will be 
linked to a poor growth performance on the basis of a measurement error.  Weede (1997) 
illustrates the importance of the data selection: he shows that the results of Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) are neither robust to different data sources, nor to the exclusion of a few 
original data points.  Quah (2000) notes that ‘researchers have long known about the biases 
and omissions in developing-country national income accounts.  Comparison of those data 
with the data of developed countries can be unreliable even when within-country analysis 
over time for a given economy is perfectly sensible’ (p. 5).     
Given these heterogeneity problems, we choose to focus on individual OECD countries.   
Measurement error is probably less severe in those countries (although data collection is still 
far from perfect).  Moreover it will enable us to evaluate the believed homogeneity within this 
group of richer countries.  Our ‘individual country approach’ is also compatible with another 
comment by Durlauf (2001): ‘Empirical growth studies virtually always assume that one 
theory is equally valid for all countries, whereas it is far more natural to think a given theory 
will explain the growth experience of each country more or less well depending on the 
country’s individual characteristics’ (p.69).  Evans (1998) shows that different growth models 
may characterise the growth experiences of well-educated and poorly-educated countries.  
Park (1994) notes that although the suggestive empirical results established in the cross-
country analyses can provide a useful guide for country studies, the challenge of empirical 
work is testing the theoretical insights against the economic evolution of individual countries   4
using time series data.  Relevant country specific information gets lost amidst the large 
number of factors affecting growth performance in cross-country studies.  Brock and Durlauf 
(2000) argue that theory and parameter heterogeneity (uncertainty) is of major importance in 
a policy-relevant empirical analysis of growth.                  
    
Endogeneity is a major problem in growth regressions.  One can quite easily argue that 
education stimulates growth, but one can as easily explain why growth influences education 
decisions.  The same holds for social security, investment, … A lot of variables have an 
impact on the growth performance, but growth in turn influences almost all economic 
decisions.  Using an instrumental variable approach to deal with endogeneity is not 
straightforward as it is problematic to identify instruments that simultaneously are correlated 
with the included growth determinants and uncorrelated with the residuals.  Durlauf (2001) 
notes that ‘those studies which attempt to use instrumental variables to address regressor 
endogeneity have not been persuasive in that the choices of instruments have not met the 
necessary exogeneity requirements for instrument validity’ (p.66).  To argue that an 
instrument is valid, means one has to show that it is uncorrelated with all growth theories not 
embodied by the regression.  But because so many factors can plausibly influence growth, 
this condition is virtually impossible to satisfy. 
A frequently used alternative solution, explaining subsequent growth by including explanatory 
variables at the beginning of the period, does not fully solve the endogeneity problem either, 
as expectations about economic growth will also matter in the decision-making process with 
respect to schooling, investment, ...    
 
A panel data estimation by fixed effects reduces the omitted variable problem as the country 
specific factors that are fixed over time are eliminated (Arjano et al. (2001), Forbes (2000)).  
Moreover, it becomes possible to evaluate the effects of changes in inequality, which is more 
relevant from a policy point of view.  But a new problem arises as estimation by fixed or 
random effects is not consistent if the specification that needs to be estimated contains a 
lagged endogeneous variable (Nickell (1981)).  Growth is known to be characterised by a 
catch-up effect (conditional convergence), which renders the fixed and random effects 
estimators useless for this kind of analysis.  Besides this additional problem, estimation by 
random or fixed effects does not deal with the endogeneity issue.    
An alternative is the use of a first-differenced GMM estimator (the Arellano-Bond estimator) 
(Forbes, 2000). This kind of estimator eliminates the country specific effects, but the need to 
identify the appropriate instruments remains.  If the first stage relationship between 
differenced independent variables and lagged level variables is weak, the GMM estimates 
will be biased towards their fixed-effects counterparts (Stock et al. (2002)).  In addition, 
Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) show that the instruments used in the first-differenced 
GMM become less informative with series that are highly autoregressive.  As inequality 
series are characterised by a high degree of persistence, there is a substantial risk that the 
GMM-results have a large finite sample bias.  The most fundamental criticism on the use of 
the Arellano-Bond estimator is that it is designed for micro data sets, i.e. for a cross section 
dimension that tends to infinity (Bond (2002)).  This condition is gravely violated in the 
context of growth econometrics.      
 
Given the above problems, how should one proceed?  We choose not to resort to the 
‘classic’ cross-country approach but focus on the time dimension in the data.  This eliminates 
problems related to parameter and theory heterogeneity.  Given the major endogeneity 
problems in growth econometrics, a VAR model seems to be a suitable framework.  A VAR 
model also steers clear of a priori restrictions (with respect to stationarity, causality, …) on 
the estimates.   One exception is the assumption of a linear relationship between the 
different variables.  This assumption is not undisputed (Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Krueger 
and Lindahl (2000)).  As we only include OECD countries in our study, the dispersion of most 
variables is quite limited.  Given this limited range, the linearity assumption seems less 
controversial.   5
Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) choose a different approach to the econometrical difficulties in 
growth regressions.  Rather by reducing the biases in estimates by improving on the 
methodology, they evaluate the bias properties (e.g. size and direction) of common 





We want to discriminate between two models of growth and inequality: the complete markets 
model (CMM) and the imperfect markets model (IMM) (Perotti (1996)).  Next to these 
models, Perotti (1996) also considers the socio-political instability model.  We do not 
integrate this third model in our analysis, as we a priori consider it to be less relevant for a 
sample of relatively stable OECD countries.   
In the CMM each economic agent can fully borrow against the present discounted value of 
future earnings.  High inequality affects investment decisions, as a higher government 
intervention (more redistributive measures) will be demanded by the population.   
Redistribution reduces growth through tax distortions and reduced capital accumulation.  In 
the IMM not all planned investment (especially in human capital) can be executed as the 
poor are credit constrained.  Redistribution to the poor relaxes the credit constraint thereby 
stimulating growth and investment.  At the same time redistribution has similar negative 
effects as in the complete markets model. 
Both models predict a negative relation between growth and inequality.  However the 
underlying mechanisms that result in this reduced form are different.  This shows that it can 
be informative to look for structural relationships rather than to use the reduced form relation 
in empirical work.   
 
We elaborate some more on the testable implications of both theories by means of a basic 
theoretical model inspired by Bénabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).  The models 
we present are deliberately kept simple which implies that some very stringent assumptions 
have to be made.  The main aim of the theoretical elaboration is to motivate the empirical 
section of the paper.  It seems needless to pursue a more ‘sophisticated’ approach.  That is 
also the rationale for presenting two models that differ with respect to the redistribution 
system: integrating both systems in one model is possible, but severely complicates the 
discussion and has little added value. A different theoretical elaboration on both models is 
provided by Sonedda (2003).  





We consider an overlapping generations model in which n individuals live for two periods.  







t d c U ln ln ρ + =     with 0 < r  <   1         ( 1 )  
 
where c and d denote current and future consumption respectively (for reasons of notational 
convenience we omit the time subscript in the discussion of the model).  The parameter r is 
a measure of time preference.  There is only one good in the economy that serves both as 
capital and consumption good.  Production of the future consumption good takes place at 





t k y η =             ( 2 )  
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The parameterη  is an efficiency measure.  In line with the work by Lindbeck (1985, 1988, 
1993) we assume that efficiency is a decreasing function of the tax rate b  
 
) (β η f =       with  0 ) ( ' < β f       ( 3 )
    
 
For simplicity and without loss of generality we impose an efficiency loss that is proportional 
to the tax rate,   
      
* ) 1 ( η κ β η − =    with    * η  the maximum efficiency (with zero tax rate)  (3’) 
0 < k § 1        
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The second factor in (2’) represents the ‘society adjusted individual education level’ 
             
α δ − =




t A e k     with   0 < a  <   1        ( 4 )  
 
where e
i denotes the education level attained by an individual i and A is the basic level of 
knowledge and skills in the society   
To increase his education level, an individual can invest in human capital (h
i).  Human capital 
investment is characterised by decreasing returns.  For highly educated people it will take 
more time, money and effort to further increase their education level (eg. higher information 






t h e =     with  0  <
δ
α
γ = <   1        ( 5 )  
  
An individual’s production level is thus determined by his own investment in human capital 
and by general knowledge and skills in society (i.e. the level of development).  The 
accumulation of knowledge and skills follows from past production activities in the private 









            ( 6 )  
 
We implicitly assume that the link between knowledge and former private production is one-
to-one.  If we allow for depreciation, i.e. only part of average past production results in 
current knowledge, the main results of the model will not change. 
Individuals differ in their initial endowments.  An individual’s endowment upon birth at time t, 
w






t A w ε =             ( 7 )
  
with
i ε  (¥0) an identically and independently distributed random shock with mean 1, that 
measures individual i's access to general knowledge at time of birth.   
   7
Individual i can either directly ‘consume’ his initial endowment
1, or invest it into the production 
of future consumption goods (according to (2’), (4) and (5)).   
Complete markets model (CMM) 
 
Current consumption will be equal to the amount of initial endowments augmented with the 
amount of borrowing (b









t h b w c − + =            ( 8 )  
 
We introduce a government that redistributes income (intra-generational transfers).  It first 
takes away a fraction b of individual income and next adds a fraction b of the average income 
in the society ( y ) to it.  We implicitly assume that redistribution occurs at no direct cost, but 
we could easily introduce a deadweight cost by adding less than the fraction b to the average 
income.  Note that redistribution will have an indirect cost due to its negative impact on 
efficiency.      
 







t b r y y d − + − = β β ) 1 (           ( 9 )  
 
with r (>1) the (gross) market interest rate endogenously determined by the loan market 





t b 0             ( 1 0 )  
 
Each individual will spread his endowment over consumption in period 1 and production in 
period 1 (consumption in period 2) as to maximize intertemporal utility (expression (1)).  In 
the case of a perfect capital market, no credit constraints exist.  Everybody can borrow freely 
as long as the capital market is in equilibrium.  
  






t d c ln ln ρ +    w.r.t. 
i
t b , 
i
t h              ( 1 1 )  
   s.t.  expression  (10) 
 
Or after substitution of (8) and (9) into (11) 
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        s.t.  expression  (10) 
          
Some straightforward manipulation of the first order conditions, leads to the following 
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1 Each individual can employ the efficiency units of labour he is endowed with to produce current consumption 




i  (see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p.283)   8
Every agent will invest the same amount of capital in the production process (irrespective of 
his initial endowment). The first derivative with respect to b is negative, so redistribution 
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Result 1a (CMM):   “If agents can borrow freely, redistribution reduces individuals’ optimal  
investment in human capital”.  
 
 
Next we derive an expression for the steady state growth: 
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g    (14) 
 
The partial derivative of g with respect to b is 
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        ( 1 5 )  
 
If there is more redistribution (larger b), growth will slow down.  Bénabou (1996) shows that  
the preferred tax rate by the median voter will depend on the relative position of his income  
to the mean of the income distribution.  The larger the gap between the median and the 
mean income is (i.e. the more skewed to the left the income distribution is), the higher the 
preferred tax rate will be.  This brings us to result 2:    
 
Result 2a (CMM):    “If capital markets are perfect and more inequality leads to more 
redistribution, then more inequality will hamper growth”. 
 
 
Imperfect market model (IMM) 
 
Now, assume that capital markets are absent (b
i is equal to 0 for all individuals) and the 
government chooses to redistribute income across generations (intergenerational transfers).   
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Future consumption equalizes production minus taxes  
 




t y d           ( 1 8 )    9
The individual’s maximization problem becomes (substitution of (17) and (18) into (1)): 
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which leads to 
 
































1      ( 2 0 )  
 
In contrast to the perfect market case, investment will differ across individuals. The first 
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The sign of expression (21) will be determined by the sign of the last factor: 
 























        ( 2 2 )  
 
As redistribution relaxes credit constraints, the poorly endowed (ε
i sufficiently low) will invest 
more.  The ‘rich’ will invest less.  The higher k, the higher the ‘cost’ of the tax system in terms 
of ‘lost efficiency’ and the lower the number of people that will benefit from redistribution.  
The effect of redistribution on aggregate investment is positive for ‘normal’ values of k (see 
appendix (A7)),    
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Total education can then be expressed as: 
 




















         ( 2 3 )  
 
The effect of redistribution is double: a higher b negatively influences efficiency (and thereby 
the accumulated knowledge and skills, A) but at the same time leads to in increase of the 
third factor of expression (23).  For normal parameter values the total effect of redistribution 
will be positive (parallel to the effect on aggregate investment).   
The effect of more equality (in the sense of a lower variance of incomes) on total education is 
univocally positive: x
g is a concave function of x (0<g<1), so by Jensen’s inequality we know 
that a more unequal distribution of endowments (larger variance of 
i
t ε ), for a given amount of 
redistribution (fixed b),  tends to lower total education. 
   10
Result 1b (IMM):   “If agents cannot borrow and returns to investment in human capital 
are decreasing, more inequality reduces total education. 
        If the efficiency loss is not excessive, redistribution has a positive 
impact on investment in human capital and education levels”.  
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1
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In contrast to the CMM, the effect of redistribution on growth is ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, a negative effect is still present through the second term of expression (24).  But now 
there is also a positive impact through the fourth term.   
 
Result 2b (IMM)::    “If capital markets are absent, redistribution will stimulate growth 
through the relaxation of credit constraints..  The ‘full’ effect of 
redistribution is less clear”. 
 
 
Before we can further explore the potential of the VAR-framework to evaluate the empirical 
validity of the above theoretical models, we need to take a closer look into the data.  Given 
the above results we need to collect time series for income inequality, human capital, 





We include 9 OECD countries in the empirical investigation.  The choice of the countries was 
somewhat forced upon us due to the limited data availability.  Fortunately the sample seems 
representative for the entire OECD.  Firstly, with Canada, France, Italy, the UK and the USA, 
5 members of the G-7 are present, next to 4 smaller countries: Belgium, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden.  Secondly, the sample contains countries with an extensive social 
security system (Belgium, Finland and Sweden) as well as countries with a limited one (the 
UK and the USA).  Thirdly, also non-EU countries are present.  It would be informative to 
include Germany in the estimates, but we lack sufficient data to do so. 
Although we have selected countries based on data availability and data consistency, we 
admit that measurement error remains a problem, especially with respect to the enrolment 
and inequality series.  Measurement error increases the noise to signal ratio of the series 
which blurs the estimation results, especially if one uses first differences (Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2000).  Therefore, the empirical results should be approached with a healthy amount 
of scepticism.    
 
For each country in our sample we collected annual data for income inequality, secondary 
and tertiary enrolment, economic growth and social security expenditure.  More detailed 
information on the inequality series is provided in Gobbin and Rayp (2003).  The enrolment 
series are described in appendix B.  Graphs of all series are presented in appendix C.   
We first motivate the variable choice.    
 





Although Cowell (1995) shows that the generalized entropy indices are theoretically superior 
to the gini coefficient for the measurement of inequality, we mainly use the latter in this 
paper.  The reason is twofold.  On the one hand the availability of the gini coefficient is far 
greater than that of any other inequality index.  On the other hand the use of the gini 
coefficient is commonplace in empirical applications.  Using the gini coefficient allows a 
comparison of our results with other studies.  However, data availability was the main 
determinant of our choice.  As we need an annual inequality measure over the longest 
possible time period, the gini coefficient turns out to be the only viable alternative.  The one 
exception is France for which we lack data on the gini coefficient and instead use the 5% top 
income share as a proxy for income inequality.     
 
A lot of recent empirical work in the field of inequality and economic growth (Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003), Forbes (2000), Barro (1999)) is based on the Deininger and Squire (DS) data 
set (Deininger and Squire (1996)).  Because the DS data set  has substantially increased 
data comparability, both over countries and time, it has somewhat become the standard for 
data sources on inequality.  Nevertheless, Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) show that there 
remain important problems, even with the so-called ‘high quality’ data in the DS data (see 
also Gobbin and Rayp (2003)).   
In its current form, the DS data set is only applicable to cross section and panel data 
estimates.  As we intent to explore a time series approach, we need to compile a suited data 
set. 
 
In our sample, the gini coefficients for the different countries are not all based on the same 
income concept, nor were they all collected in the same manner.  Some gini coefficients 
were derived from census data, others were calculated out of income tax data.  Both types 
have some drawbacks.  Income inequality measures based on income tax data might 
underestimate inequality as only those incomes that are high enough to be taxable are 
included in the calculation.  The quality of census data will depend on the representativity of 
the sample.  Atkinson (2003) and Gobbin and Rayp (2003) describe the problems related to 
the measurement of income inequality in more detail.   
 
The testable implications derived in section 3 are based on inequality of incomes before 
redistribution.  Unfortunately income data are scarce and do not always allow for a perfect 
test of the theoretical models.  Only for Belgium and for France we have data on income 
before taxes.  Even then the available time series are only imperfect proxies for the 
‘theoretically optimal choice of income’, as a. o. the government support for education is not 
taken into account.  Hence our data series serve as rough proxies for the theoretically 
optimal inequality concepts.  For most countries data availability forces us to use net income 
or household disposable income.  This has implications for the empirical exercise.  Firstly, we 
will less likely detect the link between inequality and redistribution predicted by the CMM.  
Secondly, as in the IMM redistribution matters for enrolment because it reduces ‘post-
redistribution-inequality’, we should not expect to detect a positive effect of redistribution on 
enrolment if we do not use it in combination with pre-redistribution inequality in the estimates.      
 
Based on the theoretical models we can also make some reservation with respect to the 
choice of inequality measure.  To test for the CMM, the middle incomes (median voter) 
should be highlighted.  In the IMM the bottom incomes (credit constraints) and the dispersion 
of incomes matter more.  As the gini coefficient is especially sensitive to changes in the 
middle incomes, it is an a priori acceptable choice in case of the CMM.  To test for the IMM 
one might prefer a poverty line index.  In this light the use of the top 5% income share for 
France is questionable.      12
 
All of the above remarks also matter if one uses the DS data.  Still most panel data studies 
using the DS data ignore the potential problems and use different income concepts for 
different countries in a single panel estimation (Knowles (2001)).  Rehme (2002) illustrates 
how mixing measures of gross and net income inequality can blur the estimation results if 
redistribution negatively affects growth.  Some authors correct the data for the differences in 
income concept, but Atkinson and Brandolini (1999) doubt that these adjustments really 
solve the problem. 
A related issue is that our income definition might be too narrow.  Deininger and Squire 
(1998) argue that it is the asset distribution that really matters for the systematic effect of 
inequality on growth.  They believe land distribution is to be preferred to income distribution 
as a proxy for asset distribution.     
Enrolment rates 
 
The data set includes enrolment rates in secondary and higher education as a proxy for 
human capital.  In the estimations enrolment appears as a proxy for the investment in as well 
as for the stock of human capital, which is in line with earlier work (eg. Perotti (1996), Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin (1995)).  
Although existing theoretical literature does not force us to interpret investment in this narrow 
way, human capital formation is likely to be most gravely affected due to credit constraints as 
the collateral is highly insecure.  The choice of this narrow investment variable has a 
drawback: in the absence of credit constraints the significance of the effect of redistribution 
on investment might be underestimated.  This is only a minor problem if investment in human 
and physical capital are complements rather than substitutes. 
We include both secondary and tertiary education in the estimates to capture the full effects 
of enrolment.  It seems plausible that the evolution of enrolment in secondary education was 
a driving force at the beginning of our sample (the 1960s), but that enrolment in tertiary 
education has gradually taken over this leading role.      
There is some arbitrariness in the exact definition of the enrolment rates, which also makes it 
hard to compare them across countries.  Firstly, the education system differs across 
countries.  The study length can differ, as can the age at the time of first enrolment.  This is 
of importance when computing the number of potential students, which is the denominator of 
the enrolment rate.  It is even problematic in countries that have delegated the design of the 
education system to the constituent regions (the UK and Canada).  Secondly, the education 
system can change over time.  Especially the division between primary and secondary 
education has been subject to major changes in Finland and Sweden.  For the number of 
potential students for tertiary education we look at the first 5 years after the normal end date 
of secondary education, which is of course a rough approximation.  Although the result might 
not be the best possible measure for the ‘average’ enrolment rate, we are confident that it is 
a good proxy for it (and our results robust to different choices). 
For higher education we use total tertiary education as well as university education (again a 
choice based solely on data availability).  Although the levels are clearly different, the 
correlation between both series is very high (above 95% for all countries).  Therefore, we can 
safely use the term ‘higher education’ without further distinction and concentrate on the 
longest and most consistent series.   





We use the ‘GDP at market prices, in volume and at local currency’ and ‘total population’ 
from the OECD Economic Outlook database (1960-2000) (OECD 2002b).  In the estimation 
we use the first difference of the logarithm of the ratio of GDP to total population.  As there is 
no cross-section dimension in the estimates, it is not necessary to adjust for purchasing 
power parity.     13
Social security 
 
As a proxy for redistribution we use social security expenditure.  Sinn (1994) and Wigger 
(2001) document two ways by which an increase in social security expenditure redistributes 
resources in a society.  We use the public and mandatory private social security expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP.  The data are collected from two sources.  Our basic series is taken 
from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (OECD (2002b)).  As for most countries this 
series starts in 1980 (except for Italy (1982), the Netherlands (1995) and Sweden (1993)), we 
need to extend it backwards (the final observation is for 1997).  To this end we use the 
growth rate of the comparable ILO data series.  Although the levels of both series are 
sometimes quite different, the growth rates of the OECD series and the ILO series in the 
overlapping period (1980-1993) are very similar.  The start date for the ILO series is 1960, 
but the most recent year available is at best 1993.  Missing values were obtained by linear 
interpolation. 
 
The use of social security expenditure in our set-up can be questioned.  Given the theoretical 
models we need a variable that captures both the redistributive efforts in a society (IMM) and 
the distortionary effects of fiscal policy (CMM).  Our variable choice partially meets both 
requirements.  The ideal variable again depends on the theoretical model we have in mind.  
For the IMM we want to measure the redistributive efforts that reduce capital constraints with 
respect to human capital formation.  On the one hand, social security expenditure seems too 
broad a measure as also expenditure related to health, housing, … is taken into account.  
Note, however, that relaxing capital constraints in one field, opens up resources for other 
purposes.  On the other hand not all relevant redistributive efforts are included (for instance 
study loans might be overlooked).  The CMM deals with all types of government expenditure 
that are redistributive in nature.  From this perspective our broad variable choice seems 
acceptable.  However, in the CMM not the magnitude of the expenditure, but the distortionary 
effects of the related taxation matter.  If taxation were fully lump sum, a redistributive fiscal 
policy would not distort growth.  Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Perotti (1996) propose the 
average marginal tax rate as an alternative.  Sonedda (2003) uses marginal and average tax 
rates.  But tax-based indicators also have their drawbacks as tax revenues are used for 
multiple purposes besides redistribution (e.g. defence).  Moreover, it is hard to obtain a time 
series that goes back as far as the 1960s.  As it is possible to construct a long enough and 
consistent annual time series for social security expenditure, and as no alternative variable 





A number of explorative univariate unit root tests (results not shown) indicated that more than 
half of the time series in the data set potentially display non-stationary behaviour (the tests 
for the income inequality series are discussed at length in Gobbin and Rayp (2003)).  Given 
these results and the endogeneity problems in growth econometrics, we choose to test for 
cointegration in a VAR-framework (eg. Johansen and Juselius (1994)).      
As the time dimension of our series is rather limited, we can not use asymptotic theory and 
need to perform small sample corrections.  Given the small time dimension, we only allow for 
2 lags in the VAR.  The results are only marginally altered by including a third lag.  The 
choice for 2 lags in the VAR results in a 1
st order VECM of the following form: 
 
t t t t X X X ε µ + Γ∆ + Π + = ∆ − − 1 1 0          ( 1 )  
 
where Xt is a 5x1 vector containing enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, growth, 
income inequality and social security expenditures in year t and µ 0 a vector of constants.  
Based on our univariate analysis, we do not restrict the constant to the cointegration space,   14
as some individual series display trending patterns (Franses (2001)).  This might not be in 
line with economic intuition in the longer term, but it is acceptable over the short period we 
consider.   
If not all variables in Xt are (trend) stationary, the matrix π will not be of full rank.  If the 
system is cointegrated, i.e. there exist linear combinations of the non-stationary variables 
which are stationary, we can rewrite π as the product of two full column rank matrices, 
P=ab
T.  Both matrices are of dimension 5xr, with r being the number of cointegrating 




t X X X ε αβ µ + Γ∆ + + = ∆ − − 1 1 0          ( 2 )  
    
The matrix b contains the long run (cointegrating) relationships, the matrix a the short run 
adjustments towards these long run equilibria.  
 
 
The cointegrating rank 
 
For the determination of the cointegrating rank we use the trace statistic evaluated against its 
95% critical value.  However, this is an asymptotic critical value.  Johansen (2002) illustrates 
that the actual probability of rejecting a correct null hypothesis in a finite sample is much 
larger than the 5% nominal value.  In other words: we should use higher critical test values 
than the asymptotic ones.   
Johansen (2002) introduces a correction factor for the trace statistic which should lead to a 
good approximation of these corrected critical values.  If we reject the null hypothesis with 
the asymptotic critical values, we also look at the corrected ones.  In the table the corrected 
values are in italic.  We report the asymptotic values between brackets if the conclusion 
about the rank changes due to the correction.  It should be noted that the correction factor is 
only an approximation of the actual small sample distortion (Johansen et al. (2002)).  Its 
reliability also depends on the parameter values.  However, throughout the correction 
appears to be a useful supplement to the ‘classic’ analysis (Johansen (2002)).   
 
<insert table 1 around here> 
 
We do not reject two cointegrating relations for all countries, except for Italy, Sweden and the 
UK.  If we do not apply the small sample correction, we do not reject 3 cointegrating relations 
for Canada, Finland and the Netherlands.  
 
In the presence of multiple cointegrating relations (r>1), the estimates are not unique and 
directly interpretable.  We can identify the long term relationships between the 5 variables by 
imposing coefficient restrictions and the long term relations (b) and the short run adjustments 
(a).  Based on the identified relationships we try to distinguish between the IMM and the 
CMM.  Note that the number of model results (cf. section 2) we can test simultaneously is 
equal to the number of cointegrating relationships. 
 
 
Identification of the long term relationships 
 
We identify the long run relations by imposing coefficient restrictions on the cointegrating 
vectors (beta-vector) and the short run adjustments (alpha-vector).  The choice of restrictions 
is based on the testable results of the IMM and CMM.  Again, Johansen (2002b) notes that 
the asymptotic results of the estimates are not accurate enough for small samples.  His 
results indicates that the actual size can be quite distorted (much larger than the nominal 
size) in small samples.  We do not provide a robust correction for this small sample bias, but, 
based on Johansen’s results, a correction factor for the likelihood ratio of between 1.3 and   15
1.7 seems probable.  Therefore, to convincingly reject the restrictions, the p-value should be 
sufficiently below 5%.  
 
We use the following 2-step testing procedure: 
 
1.  Can we identify the long run relations in line with the results of the IMM? 
growth = ƒ [enrolment (+); social security(-); …]   (result 2b)   
enrolment = ƒ [gini (-); social security(+); …]   (result 1b)  
   
 
2.  Can we identify the long run relations in line with the results of the CMM? 
growth =  ƒ [social security(-); …]       (result 2a) 
social security = ƒ [gini (+), …]      (result 2a) 
 
Our objective is to check whether it is possible to detect an identification of the long term 
relations in line with the theoretical models (given the limitations of the available data).  The 
identification of multiple cointegrating vectors is not unique and changing the order in which 
restrictions are imposed can sometimes drastically change the results.  Therefore, we 
systematically explore the different sequences of restrictions.  If we find both the correct 
growth and/or enrolment relation and/or inequality relation in the first step, we can argue that 
the data support the IMM.  But we can not reject the CMM.  Next we check whether the 
implications of the CMM are compatible with the long run relations.  We check whether 
growth is negatively related to social security, and whether social security is positively related 
to inequality.  The latter requirement might be somewhat too strict given the limitations of the 
dataset.  We should not be surprised if we fail to find a significant effect of inequality on 
social security expenditure if we can not use an inequality measure for income before taxes 
(i.e. for all countries except Belgium and France).  A similar argument holds for the effect of 
credit constraints on enrolment rates in the IMM.  But now the effect should not vanish: 
higher post redistribution inequality should still result in less enrolment irrespective of the 
amount of redistribution taking place.  Combined with our earlier remark that the investment 
variable might suit the IMM better than the CMM (cf. supra) the above comments indicate 
that the tests give a slight preferential treatment to the IMM, although the gini coefficient 
better fits the CMM. 
 
Note that the ambition of this empirical exercise is limited: we want to check if the data 
support the models.  Even if the data fit a model perfectly, we can not yet call this model the 
‘true model’.  We only give an indication which (if any) model suits reality better.  Also recall 
that the variables in the estimates are only approximations of the ‘theoretical’ variables in the 
models (cf. supra).    
 
<insert table 2 around here> 
 
In table 2 we present the beta matrix (after imposing restrictions), i.e. the long term relations.  
The standard errors are between brackets.  We also impose zero restrictions on the alpha 
matrix, the short run adjustments, if the coefficients have a wrong sign or if they are highly 
insignificant.  These ‘corrections’ are obviously somewhat ad hoc but they can be thought of 
as a kind of robustness check.  We do not present the alpha matrix as it is not essential in 
our analysis.   
 
For Belgium we find an enrolment relationship compatible with the IMM.  We can however 
remove income inequality after taxes from the enrolment relation.  If we use inequality before 
taxes, the elimination of the gini coefficient can not be accepted.  Social security is negatively 
related to growth, which is compatible with both models.  Enrolment in secondary education 
is positively related to growth.  The impact of enrolment in higher education on growth is not 
significant.  We can not identify a social security relation in line with the CMM.    16
Inequality is detrimental for enrolment in Canada.  As the data do not confirm the positive link 
between enrolment and growth, there is only partial support for the IMM.  The data neither 
indicate that inequality induces social security expenditure.   
We again find a robust enrolment relation for Finland.  It is hard to identify the second 
cointegration relationship in terms of the IMM or the CMM.  The data do not fit a long term 
social security nor a long term growth relationship.  The only meaningful interpretation seems 
to be an inequality relationship: income inequality is reduced by an increase in social security 
expenditure. 
For France we find a long term enrolment relationship in line with the IMM: more inequality 
reduces enrolment.  Different from other countries, economic growth is not significant in the 
relationship.  However, as enrolment rates do not significantly affect growth, the data only 
partially support the IMM.  We also find a negative impact of social security expenditure on 
economic growth.  Next we abandon the enrolment relationship and try to identify a social 
security relationship instead.  We detect a long run relationship in which social security 
expenditure are positively influenced by inequality and enrolment, and negatively by growth.  
This is a specification in line with the CMM.  Moreover the negative effect of social security 
on economic growth is still present.  Now we also find a (robust) positive link between 
enrolment in secondary education and growth.  So the CMM might be more appropriate for 
France.                    
For Italy there was only 1 cointegration relationship which does neither seem to fit the CMM 
nor the IMM.  Allowing for 2 cointegration relationships does not reduce these identification 
difficulties.      
For the Netherlands we can not identify an enrolment relation.  We do find a growth relation 
and social security relation consistent with the CMM.  More inequality leads to more social 
security expenditure and social security leads to less growth.  However, the results for the 
Netherlands might be less trustworthy, as our measure of redistribution does not capture its 
extensive system of students loans (Guille (2000)).  The fact that we can not identify an 
enrolment relation in line with the IMM might stem from that shortcoming.  Credit constraints 
will be less severe for investment in education.        
For Sweden we should again only allow for 1 cointegration relation.  We can identify this 
relation as an enrolment or as a growth relationship (results not shown).  If we identify it as 
an enrolment relation, enrolment is positively related to growth and social security 
expenditure.  Income inequality is not significant.  If we choose the second relationship social 
security expenditure reduce growth. Enrolment is not significant.  If we impose homogeneity 
between countries with respect to the cointegrating rank, i.e. ignore the test results in table 7 
and always allow for 2 cointegration relations, we are able to identify a growth relation and a 
social security relation consistent with the CMM (results not shown).  Sweden also has an 
extensive system of students loans (Guille (2000)), which might again explain the lack of 
IMM-compatible relationship in the Swedish data.   
Also for the UK we concluded that there was only 1 cointegration relationship.  This 
relationship can be reduced to the stationary behaviour of economic growth.  If we allow for 2 
cointegration relations, the second relation can be identified as an enrolment relation in 
which income inequality reduces enrolment and social security stimulates it (results not 
shown). 
For the USA we find an enrolment relation and a growth relation consistent with the IMM.  
We can not identify the social security relation implied by the CMM.  Carneiro and Heckman 
(2002) find that currently only a very marginal fraction of the US population is credit 
constrained.  Their results do not necessarily contradict ours as they themselves note that 
‘the limited role of short run credit constraints in explaining American educational gaps is, no 
doubt, in part due to the successful operation of policies that were designed to eliminate such 
constraints’. 
We never detect a significant positive relation between social security and enrolment, which 
is not really surprising given the ‘imperfect’ inequality measures (cf. supra). 
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The available data support both the IMM (3 countries) and the CMM (2 countries, 3 if we 
impose a higher cointegrating rank on the Swedish data).  Some relations can not be 
identified in terms of either the CMM or the IMM.  For France the evidence is somewhat 
mixed.  Thus different models seem to be appropriate for different countries.   
With some reservation we can draw two more general conclusions: income inequality 
reduces enrolment in most countries and the direct impact of social security expenditures on 
growth is negative.   
The findings for the Netherlands and Sweden show that it might be useful to select the 
redistribution variable on a country specific basis.  Given their extensive system of students 
loans it might not be surprising that the results for these countries are more in line with the 
implications of the CMM.  However, one needs an extensive knowledge of the particularities 




Limitations of the time series approach 
 
The time series approach deals with a number of problems that disturb the reliability of cross 
section estimates but it is unable to solve all of them.  The most important drawback is the 
limited length of the time series.  While there exist longer time series for some of the 
variables included in the VAR system, most data series (and by extension the entire VAR 
system) are limited to the 1960s (at best).  As economic growth is a long term phenomenon, 
we would prefer to include much more lags in the VAR specification.  However, we face a 
trade-off between theoretical considerations and practicability.   
If we do not include sufficient lags, the correlation between the error terms and the lagged 
variables might differ from zero resulting in inconsistent estimates.  We already argued that 
lagged values of the endogenous variables are not necessarily good instruments because of 
the importance of expectations about the future for current decision making.  So we need to 
include enough lags to cover a normal ‘planning horizon’.  Although the appropriate horizon 
is still a subject of discussion, its length will surely exceed 2 or 3 years. 
To evaluate the potential inconsistency of our results due to the presence of autocorrelation 
in the error terms, we looked at a vector error autocorrelation test.  Based on the findings of 
Doornik (1996) we applied the F-approximation of the Lagrange-multiplier test because of its 
superior behaviour in small samples.  The results indicate that autocorrelation is not much of 
a problem for the estimates involving Belgium, Canada, Sweden and the UK (we obtain a p-
value above 0.7 for each of these countries).  For France, Finland and the USA the test 
values do not reject ‘the absence of autocorrelation’ at the 10%-level, but they do reject it at 
the 20%-level for the former and at the 15%-level for the latter two.  For Italy and the 
Netherlands the results clearly reject ‘no autocorrelation’.  On the one hand these test results 
further strengthen our earlier suspicions of the Dutch data (and results), but on the other 
hand they deepen our believe in some of the other results.   
Due to the short time series, it is hard to check whether the estimated parameters are stable 
over time.  We argued that parameters differ across countries, but they might also depend on 
the level of development in an individual country.  Maddala and Wu (2000) find some 
evidence of instability over time in growth relationships.  On the other hand, because of the 
short time period covered in the estimates, this potential ‘time heterogeneity’ will be much 
lower than the ‘cross country heterogeneity’.  
In summary, our results are not unquestionable, but nonetheless the new methodology can 
serve as a valuable supplement to the techniques currently used in growth econometrics.  
The time series approach will gradually lead to more robust results as longer time series 
become available. 
 
   18
Conclusion 
 
Durlauf (2001) urged growth economists to advance in the field of growth econometrics.  The 
empirical analysis of economic growth is indeed tainted by some very serious flaws and 
shortcomings.  We accepted Durlauf’s challenge and this paper is a concise report of an 
attempt to deal with the problems typical of growth empirics.  Based on an overview of the 
most serious problems noted in the literature, we propose a methodology that deviates in two 
ways from existing work: firstly we propose a time series approach instead of a cross section 
or panel analysis, and secondly we resort to the Johansen cointegration framework, a 
methodology that, to our knowledge, has not been applied before in growth econometrics.  
These ‘innovations’ deal with heterogeneity and endogeneity problems.  However, new 
problems arise as existing data sets are not suited for this new approach.  Even for OECD 
countries it is hard to collect long and reliable time series for inequality and enrolment.  On 
the one hand, these data problems limit the workability of our method, but on the other hand 
also open up new perspectives for the future.  As longer and more reliable time series will 
become available for more countries, the trustworthiness of the results will strongly increase. 
We applied the methodology to the analysis of the relation between income inequality and 
economic growth.  Keeping the above data reservation in mind, we dare present some 
cautious conclusions.  Both the imperfect market model (Belgium, Canada, the USA)  and 
the complete market model (the Netherlands, France and with some flexibility: Sweden) find 
support in the data.  The fact that the negative effect of inequality on enrolment seems 
relevant for most countries, enhances the credibility of the IMM.  But for most countries we 
find also a negative relation between social security expenditures and economic growth, a 
central mechanism in the CMM.  However, the support for the CMM is weakened if we take 
the extensive system of students loans in the Netherlands and Sweden into account.   
An indirect conclusion is that different models seem to hold for different countries (even in 
our subset of rich countries).  If this conclusion proves to be robust, it questions the 
appropriateness of panel estimates for this kind of research and thereby also the validity of 
previous studies.     19
Table 1: cointegrating rank (growth, social security, income inequality, secondary and tertiary 
education) 
 




Income after taxes 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 2) 
Belgium  
Income before taxes 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 2) 
Canada 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected  
(asymptotic critical values: 3) 
France 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 2) 
Finland 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected  
(asymptotic critical values: 3) 
Italy 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 





1 cointegration relation is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 1) 
Netherlands 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values:3) 
Sweden 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 






1 cointegration relation is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 1) 
UK 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 





1 cointegration relation is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 1) 
USA 
(2 lags) 
H0: r=0; H1: r>0 
H0: r§1; H1: r>1 







2 cointegration relations is not 
rejected 
(asymptotic critical values: 2) 
 
Note:  The figures in italic in the fourth column are corrected values.  If we do not reject the null hypothesis (H0) on the basis 
of the asymptotic value for the trace statistic, we give the asymptotic value (not in italic) as the corrected one can only 
be higher.  If the use of the corrected values changes the conclusion, we also report the asymptotic value (between 
brackets).   20
Table 2: The long term relations 
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Equations (A1) and (A2) reveal the following expression for r: 
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which is of course equal to the after tax marginal product of human capital. 
 
From (A3) we can deduce that investment levels have to be equal across individuals 
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If we aggregate this expression over the entire population (n individuals) and use the 
restriction that the sum of net-borrowings has to equal 0 (market clearing condition), we get  
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which gives expression (12). 
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In the first step we use the assumption that there is no population growth.  Taking the natural 
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Total investment is then equal to 
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This condition is satisfied for most plausible values of k and b.  For instance for values of k 
below 1/3, the effect is positive independent of the value of b.  For values of b comparable 
to the highest average effective tax rates in the OECD (Carey and Tchilinguirian 
(2000)), k can be as high as ½.   So if the efficiency loss is not too high, redistribution will 
positively affect total investment.   












































































































Taking the natural logarithm of (A9) gives expression (24). 
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Appendix B: Enrolment rates (data description) 
 
For Belgium we have a shorter series for enrolment at university (1956 – 1992, Mitchell 
(1998)).  The correlation between this series and tertiary education is very high (98,6%).   
For Canada no distinction between students in primary or secondary education is made, 
which is partly due to the existence of different education systems in the different Canadian 
regions.  However, the sum of years in primary and secondary education is always identical.  
We suspect that the division is rather arbitrary (i.e. not based on some kind of minimum 
education programme) and have approximated secondary education by subtracting the 
population aged 5 to 11 from the original series.  As education was obligatory over the period 
1960-1998 for children at these ages, the result of the subtraction should be a reasonable 
proxy for the number of pupils in secondary schools (although officially they might belong to 
another category).  UNESCO reports total enrolment in secondary education in Canada for 
the period 1980-1995.  The ratio of our data and the UNESCO data is systematically 
between 1,05 and 1,08.  So our series might slightly overestimate the number of students in 
secondary education.  However, this error seems to be quite consistent over time.  As our 
estimation result depends on changes in enrolment, we choose not to adjust the series to 
eliminate the ‘error’.  Enrolment at university is strongly correlated (.97) with enrolment in 
tertiary education reported by the OECD (2002) over the period 1985-1997. 
The enrolment in secondary education in Finland is again an approximation.  First, we added 
the students in primary and secondary education, and next we subtracted the population 
aged 7 to 12 from that sum.  The rationale for this operation are some clear inconsistencies 
in the basic series that seem to stem from a changing division between primary and 
secondary education over the years.  Although the levels in the new series are substantially 
lower than the levels reported by the OECD (2002) over the period 1985-1993, the 
correlation between the two series is quite high (.93). 
For Italy we did not find suitable demographical data before 1970.  We extended the 
population series backwards until 1967 by shifting back age cohorts from 1970.  By doing so 
we ignore the impact of migration and death.  The latter will not be very important as we deal 
with young people.  The former might be more relevant.  However, if we look at the first 
comparable period, 1970-1972, there are only very small changes in these age cohorts.   
Therefore, we can safely assume that the error will be minor.  The correlation between 
university enrolment and tertiary education (OECD) over the period 1985-1995 is again very 
high (.97). 
Secondary enrolment in the Netherlands does not include vocational training.  If we only 
consider university enrolment (WO), the enrolment rate in higher education drops 
considerably but the correlation between both series is high (.98).     
The population statistics for the UK were collected from 3 regional sources: the Office for 
National Statistics (England and Wales), the General Register Office (Scotland) and Northern 
Ireland Statistics.   
We did not include secondary enrolment in Sweden, as the available series clearly lacked 
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Table B.1: Enrolment rates 
 
Country Enrolment  rate  Source  Period 
Belgium  Secondary education / 
Population aged 12-17  
 
Tertiary education / Population 
aged 18-22 
NIS – Statistical Yearbook 
NIS – Population Statistics 
 
NIS – Statistical Yearbook 






Canada Secondary  education 
(approximation) / 
Population aged 12-17 
 
University education / 
Population aged 18-22 











1971 – 2001 
Finland Secondary  education 
(approximation)/ 
Population aged 13-18 
 
Tertiary education / 













France  Secondary education / 
Population aged 12-18 
 
University education / 
Population aged 19-23 
Insée – Statistical Yearbook 
Insée – Statistical Yearbook 
 
Insée – Statistical Yearbook 






Italy  Lower secondary education 
(scuola media) / 
Population aged 12-14 
 
Higher secondary education 
(scuole secondari superiori) / 






Population aged 20 – 24  
ISTAT – Statistical Yearbook 
 
Eurostat – New Cronos 
 
ISTAT – Statistical Yearbook 
 
Eurostat – New Cronos 
 
Combination of lower and higher 
secondary education 
 
ISTAT – Statistical Yearbook 












1966 – 1995 
1970 – 2000 
The Netherlands  Secondary education / 
Population aged 12 – 17  
 
Tertiary education / 
Population aged 18 – 22  
CBS (MAVO + HAVO + VWO) 
CBS  
 





1950 – 1996 
1950 – 2000
The UK  Secondary education / 
Population aged 12 – 17  
 
University education / 
Population aged 18 - 22 
ONS 
ONS, GRO, NIStat 
 
Mitchell (1998) 






The USA  High School students / 
Population aged 12 – 17 
 
College students /  











Sweden  Undergraduate students / 
Population aged 19 – 23 
Statistics Sweden 
Eurostat – New Cronos  
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Appendix C: Inequality, social security expenditure, enrolment and growth in graphs 
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SEBEL SEFIN
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